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Summary 
Following the adoption by Hungary of the EU directive on CO2 emission 
trading, the emission of carbon dioxide will become a new factor of production for 
the companies concerned. Like capital, labour, land or other natural resources, CO2 
emission permits will become a scarce resource. Scarcity is a source of value, i.e. the 
right to emit carbon will be the right of a property and a business value, the 
ownership of which results in rent being earned. 
At present, the rights of emission are held by the state. If the state transfers all 
the emission permits free of charge to the companies concerned, the whole of the 
scarcity rent will turn into a windfall profit for such enterprises. If, however, the state 
sold part of the emission allowances, some of the profits stemming from scarcity 
would be retained by the state. The state may withhold all or part of the scarcity rent. 
If only part of the rent is withheld, it will be easier to involve industry in the 
development of the relevant regulation. This may be achieved by handing some of 
the emission allowances to companies free of charge and auctioning the rest. 
The state should earn revenue from the sale of the scarce allowances. On the 
one hand, this is in line with the generally accepted environment regulation principle 
(which is also recommended, for instance, by the EU and the OECD), i.e. the Polluter 
Pays Principle; on the other hand, the government will face a variety of additional 
tasks as a result of climate change (prevention and alleviation of damage, e.g. 
droughts, floods, etc.) for which additional revenue must be raised. Instead of 
through general taxation, such revenue may be raised by auctioning the allowances.  
The state could also reduce tax rates using revenues acquired from auctioning 
the allowances. In this case, the distortion of the economy by the existing tax system 
could be alleviated by cutting taxes levied on operations that are considered to be 
socially or politically desirable. Depending on the taxes whose rates are lowered 
using such allowance revenue, this measure would benefit various industries or 
economic sectors. Accordingly, reinvesting such revenue would, to some extent, also 
reduce the costs faced by enterprises in complying with the regulations.  
The lobby activities aimed at the representation of the interests of various 
industries are based on the protection of the positions of those operating in the 
industries concerned, i.e. the ‘incumbents’. The state needs to address this issue from 
the viewpoint of efficiency, since the way the initial distribution of the emission 
allowances is made, when they turn from being public goods into being privately 
owned, needs to be aimed at achieving efficiency. Well-founded economic arguments 
call for at least part of the allowances to be allocated to companies at auction. 
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Introduction  
Hungary, as a member of the EU, is obliged to introduce trading in emission 
permits and to decide on the distribution of their ownership. This study provides an 
overview of the theoretical background to this decision and the relevant EU 
regulations.1 Part one discusses the economic interpretation of the emission 
allowances and reviews the economic impact of the different modes of regulation. 
The second part of the study describes the current EU regulation, evaluating its 
economic impact. 
Theoretical foundations of emission trading, economic 
considerations 
Under an approach based on economic foundations, just as in most other 
government programmes, so economically efficient goals must be identified in the 
field of climate protection. The means of regulation that best ensure cost-effective 
implementation of these goals have then to be identified. This requires an 
assessment to be made of the social benefits and costs of the expected regulatory 
effects, both desirable and unintentional. 
When it came to climate change, the emission targets were not selected on the 
basis of an optimum economic solution. (For more details see Nordhaus and Boyer, 
1999, 2000.) Economists did play a role, though, in implementing the established 
targets, and they have designed a number of regulatory instruments to improve the 
cost-effectiveness of the way the climate protection targets are met. A number of 
traditional tools, together with modifications of these, have been used, and a variety 
of entirely new tools have been created. The economic aspects of tradable emission 
rights (allowances) – the instrument that is expected to play the largest single role – 
are discussed in this study. 
This section begins with a brief summary of the theoretical foundations of 
emission trading, which is also viewed by the EU directive as an economic type of 
environmental regulatory instrument. This is followed by a summary of the 
economic considerations we regard as most important in relation to the 
development of regulation in Hungary. 
                                                 
1 In a future study the energy market will be used as an example for the description of the economic 
impact that may result from the distribution of ownership rights based on different principles. 
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The system of tradable emission allowances as an economic 
regulatory instrument 
Having decided on the quantity of the pollutant whose emission they intend 
to limit, the authorities may offer economic entities the entire permissible quantity of 
emissions in the form of unit allowances or permits, on the understanding that, in 
future, only organisations that have such allowances may emit quantities of the 
pollutant concerned. If the allowances are transferable, an equilibrium market price 
will evolve, which means that the emission of a unit will cost the same for all 
polluters. The market price of an allowance reveals the opportunity cost of pollution 
for the polluter: this is the amount it could earn by selling its unused allowance. If, 
however, emission abatement technology is found at a cost below this market price, 
that technology will be introduced by companies, which operate in competitive 
markets, in order to maximise their profits (Montgomery, 1972). 
The following figure clearly indicates the difference between individual 
emission limit values and tradable emission allowances. Let us assume that the 
authority intends to permit pollution of volume 2Q in a market comprising two 
polluters.  
Figure 1. Cost-effective emission reduction with tradable emission allowances in the case of 
two companies with different abatement cost curves  
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Since two manufacturers will almost never have identical marginal pollution 
abatement cost curves (MACA ; MACB), if both companies had separately to comply 
with emission level Q, as is the case with individual emission permits, Company A 
would reduce its emission by an amount of QA – Q at a cost of QTQA. Keeping 
within the same emission level Q would be much more expensive for Company B: it 
could reduce its emission from level QB to level Q only at a total cost of QVQB.  
If, however, the authority permits free allocation of the total emission of 2Q, 
the result will be completely different. Since the marginal abatement cost curve of 
Company A is much more favourable than that of Company B, it is better for both 
companies if B pays A to cut its pollution further and to transfer part of its emission 
allowance to B. The exact price of such an agreement, and the distribution of 
pollution, will depend on numerous factors, but it can be approximated on the basis 
of the above curve. The last unit of the abatement of emissions from QB to Q would 
be a very high – PB – marginal cost, while Company A could reduce its emissions by 
an additional unit at the much lower marginal cost of PA. The difference between the 
two marginal costs would be somewhat smaller, but still quite substantial, in the case 
of the next to last unit of abatement of emissions. This difference will support the sale 
and purchase of emission allowances until the difference between the marginal costs 
disappears. At this stage Company B would be at point X, and Company A would be 
at point Y. It would then be cheaper for Company B to prevent the next unit of 
pollution than to pay Company A, and therefore the QB – X quantity would be 
prevented by Company B. Accordingly, the market price of the allowances will settle 
at P*, which equals the equilibrium marginal costs. 
What is the total benefit gain? If the equilibrium price of the allowances is P*, 
the total revenue of Company A from the transaction would be YZSQ. The total cost 
of preventing the extra emissions is reflected by the area under its own MAC curve, 
the size of which is YZTQ, i.e. it would have demanded at least this amount for the 
transaction. However, since it has charged a price of P* for the sale of the emission 
allowances, Company A earns a profit on the transaction of ZST.2  Company B would 
have been willing to pay a much larger amount – a total of QVWX – to avoid having 
to reduce its emissions to the level of Q, instead of only to level X. Accordingly, the 
total benefit equals QVWX – YZTQ. 
As described above, substantial cost reductions can be achieved, and even a 
net social benefit attained, if allocation of emissions allowances is permitted on the 
basis of market mechanisms. This assumes that the nature of the emissions is such 
that the authority need not set a separate individual limit for each polluter. CO2 is 
typically, indeed ideally, such a material: it has no local effects at all that would make 
the growth of CO2 emissions harmful at certain locations. Only the globally emitted 
quantity is important, and even then, of the total quantity, it is only the stocks that 
accumulate in the atmosphere on a permanent basis that make a difference. 
                                                 
2 The figure will be modified in the case of transaction costs. 
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The system of tradable allowances ensures that pollution does not exceed the 
limit set by the authorities. Accordingly, this system is highly reliable in meeting 
environmental goals, though the costs entailed are obviously uncertain, since the 
price of the allowances is determined by the market. As a consequence, the actual 
price of the allowances (and the opportunity cost of retaining an allowance) may 
vary quite substantially. If there is a need for regulation based on a predictable cost 
level price, then emission taxes are probably more suitable. 
The most sensitive practical problem relating to regulation by tradable 
allowances is associated with the distribution of emission permits, i.e. the initial 
allowance allocation. If the trade in allowances does not carry a transactional cost, 
the initial allowance allocation will not influence the efficiency of regulation: 
companies competing with one another and aiming to maximise their profits will 
also try to reduce the opportunity cost by using the market, i.e. there is a willingness 
both to sell and to buy, and consequently optimum pollution allocation may be 
expected to develop quickly. At this point, the initial allocation of the allowances has 
an influence on income transfers. Rent-seeking definitely needs to be taken into 
account. And if it is (rightly) assumed that substantial transaction costs hinder the 
trading in allowances, or if a dominance develops in the market of allowances or of 
products – which may even reinforce one another – the initial allowance allocation 
may also have a substantial effect on the efficiency of regulation, for such factors may 
hinder the balancing of the marginal cost of emission abatement. The issues of 
allocation will be dealt with in more detail in the related study No. 2.3 
Economic questions relating to the development of regulation  
Effects on rents 
As a result of the regulation, the emission of CO2 into the atmosphere will become a 
new factor of production for the companies concerned. Just like capital, labour, land 
or other natural resources, CO2 emission permits will become a scarce commodity. 
Scarcity is a source of value, i.e. the right to emit carbon will be a business asset, the 
ownership of which results in rent being earned. 
At present the rights of emission are held by the state. If the state sells the 
rights to emit CO2 to companies, the rent associated with scarcity will be collected by 
the state. This may be achieved, for example, by auctioning the whole of the available 
allowances. The effects on CO2 emissions and reallocation are illustrated in the 
following figure. 
                                                 
3 In the process of publication, 12th Working Papers of the Ministry of Finance. 
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Figure 2. Development of CO2 emissions and the distribution of rent in the case of the 
auctioning of all the allowances  
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Abbreviations used in the figure: 
P: price, cost, benefit (e.g. HUF ,000) 
Q: emission abatement, quantity of CO2 emission reduction (e.g. in tonnes/ year) 
a: total abatement, the quantity of CO2 emission prevented (e.g. tonnes/year) 
MAC: CO2 marginal abatement cost curve (e.g. HUF ,000/tonne) 
P*: equilibrium market price of CO2 emission allowance (e.g. HUF ,000/tonne of emission 
allowance) 
Q0: original CO2 emission 
Q1: CO2  emission after the reduction in emission 
 
It is clear that companies will prevent the emission of a quantity a of pollutant 
by all means, because its total cost is lower than purchasing an allowance that 
corresponds to quantity a. For the rest of the emissions they will purchase 
allowances, since their marginal emission abatement cost exceeds the marginal cost 
of purchasing allowances. On the whole, therefore, they will purchase allowances for 
an amount of Q1 x P* from the state and the rent on the scarcity of this ‘resource’ will 
be collected by the state.4  
                                                 
4 In fact, the amount of the rent to be received by the state will depend on the valuation of the scarce 
CO2 emission allowances by the market at the time. If scarcity prevails in the longer term and, despite 
technological advances, the economy continues to emit CO2, the scarcity value may even increase – 
something that may not have been foreseen by the markets. Accordingly, as a result of economic 
growth and of the increase in demand for CO2 emission permits, further substantial amounts of rent 
may be collected by entities that today purchase scarce emission permits at auction. By contrast, if 
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It is more appropriate to refer to the retention of rents in community than in 
state ownership, for, rather than exclusive ownership by the state, what we have is 
the possibility of CO2 and other greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from a wide 
variety of other production and consumption activities, too. For all operations, 
whether or not they participate in the trading scheme, have to share in the limited 
total national emission allowance. The state could levy a CO2 tax on trading and non-
trading activities alike, which could keep emissions below a given level, if the 
Hungarian state were to strictly enforce the total GHG ceiling – which would, 
indeed, be expected of the state as a member of the European Union (for more details 
see section 3). 
The following figure shows that, from the aspect of rent, the levying of a CO2 
tax is a solution equivalent to auctioning, if the rate of the CO2 emission tax equals 
the equilibrium price of the allowances that would otherwise be auctioned. 
Figure 3. Development of CO2 emission and rent distribution in the case of the introduction 
of a CO2 tax  
 
t 
P 
a 
MAC 
CO2 reduction 
Total abatement 
cost 
Q1
Total amount of CO2 tax 
payment 
0 Q0
Abbreviations used in the figure: 
P: price, cost, benefit (e.g. HUF ,000) 
Q: emission abatement, quantity of CO2 emission reduction (e.g. in tonnes/ year) 
a: total abatement, the quantity of CO2 whose emission is prevented (e.g. tonnes/year) 
MAC: CO2 marginal abatement cost curve (e.g. HUF ,000/tonne) 
                                                                                                                                                        
economic development is not as CO2 intensive as expected, the existing markets may overestimate the 
value of acquiring scarce emission permits. 
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t: rate of the CO2 tax (e.g. HUF ,000/tonne of emission) 
Q0: original CO2 emission 
Q1: CO2 emission after the reduction in emissions 
 
The above figure shows that levying a tax of rate t would result in a reduction 
in emissions of quantity a in the business sector. The amount of tax revenue accruing 
to the state would be: 
Q1 x t 
If t equals the equilibrium allowance price – P* – in the alternative case of 
auctioned allowances, the CO2 tax revenue to the state equals the revenue from the 
auctioning of allowances. 
The state may withhold all or part of the scarcity rent. If only part of the rent is 
withheld it will be easier to involve industry in the development of the relevant 
regulation (Baumol and Oates, 1988). This may be achieved by giving away some of 
the allowances free of charge to the enterprises concerned, auctioning the rest, or 
making it possible for companies to acquire allowances for fixed-price payments, 
similar to a tax. Though not so efficient, this latter solution does avoid the price risk 
of an auction, and at the same time it imposes a ceiling on the secondary market price 
of the allowances (McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 1997; Pizer, 1997).  
If, however, the state transfers all the emission permits to the enterprises 
concerned free of charge, the whole of the rent associated with the scarcity of this 
commodity will turn into an extraordinary profit for the recipient enterprises. The 
effects of this extreme solution on CO2 emission and on the redistribution of the 
scarcity rent are shown in figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Development of CO2 emission and rent distribution in the case of the allocation of 
CO2 emission allowances entirely free of charge 
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Abbreviations used in the figure: 
P: price, cost, benefit (e.g. HUF ,000) 
Q: emission abatement, quantity of CO2 emission reduction (e.g. in tonnes/ year) 
a: total abatement, the quantity of CO2 whose emission is prevented (e.g. tonnes/year) 
MAC: CO2 marginal abatement cost curve (e.g. HUF ,000/tonne) 
P*: equilibrium market price of CO2 emission allowance (e.g. HUF ,000/tonne of emission 
allowance) 
Q0: original CO2 emission 
Q1: CO2  emission after the reduction in emissions 
 
Two important points should be highlighted with respect to this figure. Let us 
assume that the equilibrium allowance price has not been altered by the distribution 
of allowances free of charge instead of at auction. (This situation may be possible, for 
instance, in relation to a large, uniform, liquid trading system and a small partial 
market.) In this case an observation needs to be made, which may perhaps be 
surprising at first sight, i.e. that the total abatement a equals the amount of emission 
abatement in the case of distribution at auction. Accordingly, instead of through the 
distribution of allowances, the trend in CO2 emissions is determined by the 
development of the costs of emission and the costs of reducing emissions. (For 
further details see Montgomery, 1972). 
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It should be noted that the low marginal cost of reducing emissions means 
that companies will sell part of the emission allowance (Q0) they have been allocated. 
The revenue from the sale of the allowances – (Q0 – Q1) x P* – will be booked by the 
seller companies, from which they will derive an extraordinary profit after the costs 
of emission reduction are deducted. This profit is a windfall profit, originating 
exclusively from the introduction of the regulation.  
The efficiency of regulation 
Exclusively quantity-based regulation in an allowance trading scheme would 
entail excessive uncertainty as to the social costs of compliance. It is theoretically 
proven that it is extremely difficult to achieve a regulation scheme that is efficient 
enough from the perspective of meeting the goals of climate protection, exclusively 
through quantity-oriented objectives (allowances) (Weitzman, 1974; Nordhaus and 
Boyer, 2000). Furthermore, quantity-oriented regulation is also vulnerable from the 
aspect of redistribution as well. At the same time, quantitative regulation does have 
the political advantage of ensuring compliance with the quantity limits without 
revealing the costs (Kerekes, 2001). In the case of certain environmental problems, the 
establishment of such a limit is justified (e.g. regulation of the emission of extremely 
toxic substances), but in the case of greenhouse gases there is no argument for a 
quantitative goal that must be attained at any cost. The possibility of a purely price-
based regulation is ruled out by Hungary’s integration policy. As far as Hungary is 
concerned, it is especially important to emphasise that price-based regulation – e.g. 
through taxation – has a very valuable feature, namely that it is possible to clearly 
identify the cost of compliance with the regulation. The most important argument 
against it is that the quantity of CO2 emission becomes uncertain. Protection against 
this is offered by hybrid or open-ended systems. 
Open-ended quantity-based regulation may be the best solution for Hungary, 
even if, alongside the primary GHG polluters, the electricity generating market is 
taken into consideration. Hybrid systems combine free allowance allocation with 
some allocation mechanism that contains an economic efficiency incentive, such as 
auction-based or fixed-tax-based allocation. A hybrid regulation system would mean 
the allocation of a limited quantity of allowances free of charge, followed by the 
development of a secondary market for allowances, where additional emission 
allowances may be purchased to top up the allowances received free of charge. A 
hybrid system combines the flexibility of the allowance system with the transparency 
of the taxation system. This could also provide protection against the adverse market 
impacts of oligopoly structures in the power-generating market and technological 
factors. 
Accordingly, the planning of an efficient national GHG regulation requires the 
distribution of a quantity of emission allowances free of charge that is below the 
original emission level but that exceeds zero (Pezzey, 2003). This level should 
probably be determined on the basis of political, rather than economic, efficiency. In 
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one of our papers relating to this issue (Lesi and Pál, 2003) there is a proposal for a 
method to determine the economically desirable amount of free allowances without 
excessive windfall profits or stranded costs for the regulated companies. This level 
may be referred to as a rent-neutral allocation because in principle there may be a 
quantity where the net rent effect of the windfall gains and losses from the allocation of free 
allowances and the introduction of the CO2 regulation equals zero. 
The regulatory preliminaries of the EU CO2 emission trading 
scheme 
EU climate protection policy is developing in a political atmosphere 
dominated by the much-debated Kyoto Protocol and the diplomatic processes 
surrounding its ratification. Nevertheless, on a political level, the EU (i.e. the Council 
and Parliament) has also approved the Commission’s initiative that, regardless of the 
success of the Kyoto Protocol (its coming into force and the fulfilment of the 
commitments), the EU should incorporate implementation of the GHG emission 
reduction objectives of the member states in the community body of law 
(COM[2001]579). The following section presents an overview of the regulatory 
preliminaries to this decision. 
The Kyoto Protocol  
The third conference of participants in the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, which saw the Kyoto Protocol adopted, took place in December 
1997 after decades of technical and professional debate and over five years of 
international diplomatic preparation (UNFCCC [1997]). In its original version, the 
countries listed in Appendix B to the Protocol undertook to make a reduction in the 
emission of greenhouse gases (GHG) specified by the Protocol to below the 1990 
level, by a percentage averaged over the five years between 2008 and 2012. Overall, 
the nations undertook to reduce emissions by 5.2%. The Protocol will come into effect 
once at least 55 countries have ratified, provided they represent at least 55% of the 
total GHG emissions of the countries that have made their commitments. The 
debates in the years following the adoption of the Protocol have shown that this is 
going to be a very tough condition indeed. Without the participation of the US, it is 
very difficult to see the Protocol entering into effect. For this reason – and in view of 
the increasingly resolute intent of the US to stay out of the Protocol – the 
governments of the countries committed to the Protocol, UN diplomats and various 
green movements have started to modify the framework in an effort to persuade 
some hesitant states to join. In March 2001, when the US officially announced that it 
would not ratify the Protocol, it was already clear that the original concepts would 
have to be modified in respect of two major issues that emerged during the rounds of 
negotiations in Bonn and Marrakech. One is the issue of compliance by means of 
domestic measures, and the other is the question of so-called ‘sinks’. Sinks are areas 
where carbon dioxide, removed from the atmosphere by vegetation, primarily by 
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trees, is fixed in the long term. Later on (in Bonn and Marrakech) existing forests that, 
if preserved, have large GHG storage capacities, were also recognised as sinks. In 
parallel, the EU also gave up its previous, firmer standpoint concerning the rather 
limited role of international carbon trade and accepted that the participants may 
conduct substantial carbon trading as well as relevant domestic actions. This was a 
major concession on the part of the EU over what is referred to as ‘hot air’. For the 
debate was not centred on what had already been proved by numerous economic 
models, that international carbon trading – if certain conditions are met – can 
substantially reduce the cost of fulfilling the commitments (see, for instance, The 
Energy Journal Special Edition 1999). What caused the insistence on domestic action 
contrary to the above was, firstly, the GHG quantity of ‘hot air’, the emission of 
which was cut by the former socialist countries ‘incidentally’, as a consequence of the 
decline in domestic output in the crisis following the collapse of the centrally 
planned economy, and secondly the fact that the slow economic growth that had 
begun stemmed from a less energy-intensive structure. This immense quantity 
would offer one of the cheapest abatement options in the international trading 
system for the developed countries as well. According to some research findings 
(Böhringer, 2002) if no restriction is placed on the sale of the already reduced 
quantity (hot air) existing in the former socialist countries, then, with the abstention 
of the US, the effects of the Kyoto Protocol will practically vanish and carbon prices 
will be reduced to zero. The reason for this is that the GHG volume undertaken to be 
reduced by the developed countries – minus the USA – is more or less equal to the 
quantity of hot air readily available for sale in Russia, the Ukraine and the rest of the 
East European countries. This situation could only be changed to some extent if 
Russia acted as a monopoly seller, making efforts to raise the price of emission 
permits above zero through some quantitative restrictions. This could actually lead 
to some additional emission reduction. This issue will be largely determined by the 
development of the practice of the four flexibility mechanisms specified in the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
Under certain circumstances, in the course of the fulfilment of a commitment, 
substantial income may be channelled from a country that has already carried out a 
number of emission-cutting measures and thus has low unit emission ratios, towards 
countries that have taken practically no steps to reduce their emissions, as a 
consequence have high unit ratios, and can carry out a variety of low-cost emission 
abatement measures.5
                                                 
5 The paradox of the Kyoto undertakings: countries with economies of relatively low carbon intensity 
will pay countries with economies that are much more carbon intensive, for, in the course of the 
increasingly likely international trading of emission permits, according to the majority of the relevant 
models, Japan and the EU will purchase emission abatement from the US and Russia (see, for instance, 
Ciorba et al., 2001). As a matter of course, a number of structural impacts – such as the contributions 
of the various sectors to the gross domestic product of different countries – need to be taken into 
account. If a fundamentally carbon-dependent sector makes a large contribution to the GDP of a given 
country, the unit carbon ratios of that country will be high irrespective of the level of the unit emission 
of the given sector in comparison to the corresponding sectors of other countries. Indicators in a 
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The flexibility mechanisms 
The Kyoto Protocol recognises four so-called ‘flexibility mechanisms’, which 
may be applied by the signatories to facilitate the fulfilment of their undertakings. 
The four mechanisms are: ‘bubble’, (Article 4.1 UNFCCC [1997]); joint 
implementation (JI), (Article 6.1 UNFCCC [1997]); clean development mechanism 
(CDM), (Article 12.2 UNFCCC [1997]); and international emissions trading (ET) 
(Article 17 UNFCCC [1997]). The bubble mechanism is already operating, as are the 
two bilateral project-based mechanisms that provide direct climate development 
investment projects for the host country, and the possibility of acquiring emissions 
avoided as a result of an investment project (carbon credit) through administrative 
intergovernmental agreements, for the investing country (CDM, JI). As a result of the 
development of a trading system based on tradable emission permits, the emission of 
all the greenhouse gases expressed in carbon or CO2 equivalent is turning into an 
exchange-traded commodity. In principle, the Kyoto Protocol permits three types of 
GHG trading systems. The Protocol specifically mentions the transfer of allowances 
between states (international tradable allowances) but according to the text, trading 
systems within a given country (domestic tradable permits) and the international 
trade in emission permits (international tradable permits) are also regarded as 
acceptable. 
Since the location of the emission of greenhouse gases does not make a 
difference from a global perspective, the climate protection investment possibilities 
do not compete with one another on the basis of the cost of abatement alone, within 
one flexibility mechanism. Rather, the flexibility mechanisms compete with one 
another: if the unit carbon cost of the savings that can be realised through a JI project 
are much higher than the market price of the tradable permits, then the JI plan finds 
no investor; if it is lower, the permits will not sell. 
The future of the Protocol 
If the US refuses to join, the goals of the Kyoto Protocol are not likely to be 
achieved. For the time being, even the Protocol’s entry into effect is not certain 
because an insufficient number of countries have committed themselves to the 
scheme, and because the total GHG commitments may fall short of 55%. As this 
study is being finalised, it all hinges on Russia’s decision whether the conditions for 
the Protocol’s entry into force will be met. Even if it does come into force, the 
question will still remain as to whether the restriction on international carbon trading 
means the developed countries assume substantial costs without standing a chance 
of achieving reductions in excess of 2–3%, or whether they accept zero reduction at 
zero cost. In the first case, the actual impact of reduction on the climate will be 
                                                                                                                                                        
sectoral breakdown contribute to the picture based on national aggregate ratios. In each of the sectors 
that are covered by the carbon-trading system according to the EU directive unit emission levels are 
always higher in the USA and Russia than in Europe or Japan.  
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negligible, but it will entail substantial costs for certain countries. In the second case, 
however, the start of actual reductions will be postponed for as long as there are 
surpluses in Eastern Europe. A number of countries are in a position whereby they 
may not even sell between 2008 and 2012 the surplus they have today because their 
GHG emission is growing at a rate that may not permit them to enter the 
international market as sellers. This will be especially true if the process of climate 
protection intensifies and a second compliance period takes shape for the period after 
2012.  
The climate policy of the European Union 
Under the Kyoto Protocol the European Union undertook to reduce the 1990 
level of greenhouse gas emissions by an average of 8% between 2008 and 2012. By 
applying the bubble mechanism and the principle of burden sharing, the EU – as a 
signatory to the Kyoto Protocol in its own right – was granted the right to 
redistribute the 8% reduction among its member states. In this way the EU has to 
fulfil its undertaking at a community level, which allows greater cost-effectiveness 
within the European Union and the undisturbed continuation of the cohesion policy 
aimed at accelerating and deepening the economic integration of the member states. 
The following table shows that within the ‘EU bubble’ some member states assume 
the obligation to carry out substantial reductions in emissions ‘free of charge’ from 
countries with less well-developed economies (Greece, Spain, Ireland, Portugal); 
that is, in the form of non-fiscal support implemented in the framework of the 
European cohesion policy. 
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Table 1. Burden sharing within the EU bubble 
 
Emission reduction undertaken under the Kyoto 
Protocol as a percentage of the 1990 emissions, in the 
15 EU member states  
Belgium 92.5 
Denmark  79 
Germany  79 
Greece  125 
Spain   115 
France   100 
Ireland  113 
Italy 93.5 
Luxembourg 72 
Netherlands   94 
Austria 87 
Portugal 127 
Finland   100 
Sweden 104 
United Kingdom 87.5 
European Union 92 
 
Source: Council Decision of 25 April 2002; Official Journal of the European Union (2002). 
 
Today’s forecasts are more or less in agreement that, without a change in the 
trend of emissions, EU CO2 emissions between 2008 and 2012 will, on average, 
exceed the 1990 level, and consequently steps will have to be taken to modify the 
trend of the basic processes if the Kyoto undertaking of an 8% reduction is to be met.6 
There is a growing commitment inside the EU to meet it. At the negotiation rounds 
in Bonn and Marrakech the Kyoto process was only saved by the resolute stance of 
the European Union. In 2001 the Community confirmed its intent and ensured the 
survival of the Kyoto Agreement after the failure of the round of negotiations in The 
Hague, through its resolve and its willingness to compromise in Bonn and 
Marrakech. In parallel, at the Community level, an internal package of measures was 
adopted concerning EU member states, with the aim of meeting the emission 
                                                 
6 Commission Staff Working Paper: Third Communication from the European Community 
under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 30 November 2001; downloaded in 
September 2002 from the following site: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/eunc3.pdf 
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reduction targets prescribed in the EU bubble, should the Kyoto Protocol fail to come 
into force.7
The ‘increasingly serious’ European climate protection strategy will have a 
major direct and indirect impact on Hungary’s carbon emissions. On the one hand, 
with its huge potential volume, the European CO2 trading scheme, which covers the 
overwhelming majority of emissions, will obviously result in a stable market price 
for CO2. This will naturally determine the carbon price that will come to prevail in 
the Hungarian market, just as it will influence the price of CO2 that may be sold ‘in 
the market’ of other Kyoto mechanisms as well. With respect to its market-related 
aspects, the most important fact is that EU member states will be seeking a 
substantial quantity of carbon dioxide on the markets, in part on their own internal 
community markets, but also, to a significant degree, on the international carbon 
markets. The total carbon dioxide emissions of EU member states in 2010 is forecast 
to be some 3,457 million tonnes a year (COM[97]514) (baseline scenario). If this needs 
to be reduced by some 7.5% in real terms in order to meet the EU’s Kyoto 
undertakings, then additional CO2 emission permits for approximately 259 million 
tonnes will be required on average each year in the five years between 2008 and 2012, 
to be achieved through domestic measures or from the stocks of the Kyoto 
allowances of other countries (‘Assigned Amount Units’ or AAUs). Accordingly, 
(apart from domestic measures) the minimum quantity that the EU-15 member states 
intend to purchase in the market will amount to a total of 1,300 million tonnes of CO2. 
Today’s CO2 prices vary widely: at present, in bilateral transactions concluded for 
high-quality carbon credits (reliable, authentic source and large volume) the price of 
one tonne of CO2 varies between 4 and 9 Euros.8 The integration and the increasing 
transparency of markets are expected to lead to declining prices, but the huge 
                                                 
7 This climate protection package comprises three main elements: 
Communication from the Commission on the implementation of the first phase of the European 
Climate Change Programme (COM[2001]580) – in this document the Commission reports, among 
other things, that the institutional obstacles are being removed to enable implementation of negative-
cost energy efficiency investment projects; 
Proposal for Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by the European Community (COM[2001]579) – in this 
document the Commission laid out its proposal that, by the World Conference on Sustainable 
Development scheduled to take place on the 10th anniversary of the UN Climate Conference in Rio,  
i.e. by August 2002 – the member states should have ratified their Kyoto commitments, i.e. they 
should have integrated their commitments into their national legislation (Rio Plus 10); 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a scheme for 
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community (COM[2001]581) – according to the 
proposal, the quantity of carbon dioxide that may be emitted by a specific group of enterprises shall 
be embodied in tradable emission rights from year 2005. The total quantity of such permits should be 
fixed by the member states in accordance with their own undertakings, but CO2 trading will also be 
allowed among member states. (For a detailed analysis of the Directive, see below). 
8 For example, see the home page of the JI agency of the Dutch govt: www.carboncredits.nl 
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demand will drive prices upwards.9 Based on an assumed price of 5 Euros the 
European carbon market alone is estimated to be worth some EUR 6.5 billion. 
On the other hand, it has long been recognised in the European Union that 
there is a need for an appropriate carbon cost to be applied throughout the economy, 
to prevent ‘leakage’ in some sectors, while other sectors of the economy spend 
substantial amounts on constraining CO2 emissions. For this reason, a number of 
countries have already transformed their taxation regimes to take account of climate 
protection requirements. On the whole, it may be concluded that there is a good 
chance of a single system of carbon taxation in the European Union, and this should 
be carefully monitored by Hungary, as a country preparing for accession.  
The EU’s CO2 emission trading directive  
The early stance taken by the EU on the trading of emission allowances has 
gradually changed. After its initial firm rejection, the Community position has 
gradually ‘softened’ and some member states are already operating GHG trading 
systems (such as the United Kingdom and Denmark). In October 2001 the European 
Commission approved the draft directive on mandatory implementation of emission 
trading in GHG (COM[2001]581). In January 2003 the Council of Ministers came to a 
political agreement on the modifications to the original draft of the Commission 
(COM[2002]680) proposed by the European Parliament, and in autumn 2003 the 
Directive came into force (Directive 2003/87/EC). The key elements of the Directive 
are: establishment of a limit on the quantity of emissions and free tradability below 
this limit (cap-and-trade), mandatory participation, legal enforceability to be 
ensured, and penalties for non-compliance. This section will review the regulatory 
and institutional details of the Directive. 
Regulatory tasks, system of institutions 
The Directive imposes important regulatory tasks on the governments of the 
member states in two ways. On the one hand, it calls for the application of a brand 
new regulatory instrument, quite unknown to the majority of member state 
administrations. On the other hand, it provides for the initial distribution of part of 
the CO2 emission permits. This will appear in the form of a privatisation decision 
entailing the transfer of valuable rights. 
                                                 
9 Current estimates assume zero or almost zero price in the case of the free sale and purchase of the 
Russian and Ukrainian carbon surplus (hot air) and the abstention of the USA. 
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The emissions of enterprises concerned  
Enterprises with a specific minimum output capacity in five sectors fall within 
the scope of the Directive. The power sector – with its substantial emissions that 
account for at least half of the total CO2 load and its small number of point sources, 
together with the ease of its regulation – is the focal point of the Directive. The 
Directive covers practically all power plants, since it applies to all furnaces with an 
input heat capacity exceeding 20 MWth. This corresponds to a power capacity of 
about 6–8 MWe.10
Some 4–5,000 enterprises are thought to be subject to mandatory participation, 
through which some 46% of the total CO2 output of the European Union will be 
regulated. In this way the Directive may be definitely regarded as substantive and 
tough, though not totally consistent. Three very important sectors – the chemical 
industry, the aluminium industry and the transport sector – seem to have been left 
unaffected. The chemical industry and the aluminium industry seem to have a 
substantial potential to reduce GHG emissions, and it is expected that they will be 
drawn within the scope of the regulation. The GHG emissions of transport are also 
growing steeply, but their regulation is complicated by both technical and political 
considerations. Administrative effectiveness was one of the goals behind the design 
of the regulation, and therefore the groups of enterprises covered by the Directive are 
identical to those covered by the EU Directive on Integrated Pollution Prevention 
and Control (IPPC). According to the Directive, the enterprises of the sectors 
concerned are expected to save some 35% of the relevant costs – about EUR 1,300 
                                                 
10 Operations covered by the Directive:  
Energy activities 
Combustion installations with a rated thermal input exceeding 20 MWth 
Mineral oil refineries 
Coke ovens 
Production and processing of ferrous metals  
Metal ore roasting or sintering installations 
Installations for the production of pig iron or steel with a capacity exceeding 2.5 tonnes/hour 
Mineral industry  
Installations for the production of cement clinker in rotary kilns with a production capacity 
exceeding 500 tonnes/day or lime in rotary kilns with a production capacity exceeding 50 
tonnes/day  
Installations for the manufacture of glass including glass fibre with a melting capacity 
exceeding 20 tonnes/day 
Installations for the manufacture of ceramic products by firing, in particular roofing tiles, 
bricks, refractory bricks, stoneware or porcelain, with a production capacity exceeding 75 
tonnes/day 
Paper industry  
Pulp from timber or other fibrous materials 
Paper and board with a production capacity exceeding 20 tonnes/day  
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million a year – in comparison to a regulation that resulted in similar emissions 
abatement without trading in permits. 
Of all the greenhouse gases, only CO2 falls within the scope of the Directive. 
The Commission will draw up a proposal first by 31 December 2004, and then by 30 
June 2006, for the scope of the Directive to be extended to the other greenhouse gases 
listed in the Kyoto Protocol.11
Permit vs. allowance 
According to the Directive, the member states are obliged to provide GHG 
emission permits for a certain group of companies, setting out clearly that each 
permit holder must have an allowance of a quantity that corresponds to the quantity 
of its GHG emissions. However, in addition to the obligations, an emission permit 
also provides rights for the regulated companies, for an emission permit entitles the 
holder to the amount of emission allowances determined by the state in accordance 
with the allocation mechanism prescribed by the legal regulations in effect. This may, 
in certain cases, be a right of a very high value, because, if the existing emissions are 
allocated free of charge, this could provide a very significant source of income for 
enterprises with emission permits. The enterprises that do not have GHG emission 
permits at the time the national allocation plan is drawn up will not be entitled to the 
allowances allocated by the state under such favourable conditions. If their 
operations are covered by the regulation, they will need to purchase allowances in 
line with the quantity of their emissions, in the secondary market for allowances. The 
only exception to this may be where, at the time of initial allowance allocation, the 
state sets up a separate pool for new entrants to the sectors concerned (see below). 
An emission permit may not be transferred: it is valid for a given facility, 
polluter or company, and is one of the institutions of the regulation. Tradable 
emission rights are defined by the Directive as emission allowances. An emission 
allowance is a certificate similar to a securities bond, and it proves to the authorities 
(national registry) that the holder of the allowance has released a given quantity of 
GHG (expressed in terms of tonnes of carbon) legitimately during the given period.  
                                                 
11 This would be highly important for Hungary, particularly with respect to methane and dinitrogen 
oxide: 
- Methane (CH4) 
- Dinitrogen-oxide (N2O) 
- Fluorinated hydrocarbons (HFCs) 
- Perfluorcarbons (PFCs) 
- Sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) 
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 Emission permit 
‘Permit’ 
This is valid for a given entity, facility 
Not transferable  
The entity must not operate without this 
It contains monitoring, reporting and 
verification obligations  
Imposes obligations on the holder to submit 
an ‘allowance’ that corresponds to the 
quantity of its annual CO2 emissions  
It does not contain an emission limit value  
Allows sanctions to be applied; is a 
requirement for the operation of the 
institution  
 
Emission allowance 
‘Allowance’ 
This is valid for the emission of a tonne of 
CO2  
Freely transferable  
The permit holder must not emit CO2 
without this  
Uniform EU-wide definition 
It must be recognised by all member states  
It may be purchased by any natural or legal 
person  
It is issued and cancelled by the national 
authority  
It must be kept in the national register  
 
 
Validity of the emission allowances 
Allowances issued by any EU member state under conditions that comply 
with the Directive must be recognised by all other member states. This will turn the 
allowances into a uniform exchange-traded commodity across Europe. 
The Directive provides for two trading periods: a three-year period between 
2005 and 2007, and a five-year period between 2008 and 2012. Furthermore, the 
Directive makes several references to the subsequent five-year periods as the 
dominant regulatory frameworks. Mandatory regulation concerning the first period 
is based primarily on the Commission’s concept, rather than on the Kyoto 
undertakings of the member states, since the targets relate only to the average of the 
five-year period beginning in 2008. Nevertheless, the Commission has adopted an 
introductory period, during which somewhat easier conditions apply. The declared 
objective for the period between 2005 and 2007 is preparation for the actual period of 
compliance. The directive assigns to the individual member states the right to decide 
whether emission permits may be carried over from the introductory period to the 
second period (between 2008 and 2012); in other words, whether continuity of 
ownership rights acquired between 2005 and 2007 should be provided for the 
regulatory period beginning in 2008. Unused emission allowances acquired during 
the period between 2008 and 2012 can, according to the legislator’s intent, definitely 
be carried over to the next regulatory period. 
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Allocation 
The member states will have to produce allocation plans for approval by the 
Commission. An allocation plan should contain the total quantity of all the 
allowances and the mode by which the allowances are allocated. The Directive 
expects eleven criteria to be satisfied by the allocation plan, though some contradict 
others. The most clearly conflicting principles are as follows: 
– taking into account the best available technologies and the resulting CO2 
emission reduction potential;  
– taking account of the actual emissions and the previous emission reductions 
before the allocation. 
In view of the competition policy references in the text, no single company 
may be granted more emission allowance than is needed for its continued 
undisrupted operation: violations of this principle will be prohibited by the 
Commission as illegal state aid. 
According to the text of the Directive, some 5% of the allowances to be 
allocated in the first regulatory period may be transferred by a member state to the 
companies concerned through auctions. In the second period (the ‘live’ Kyoto 
period), this proportion will be 10%, but the Commission will draw up a proposal for 
a harmonised allowance allocation scheme for the whole of the Union, by 30 June 
2006. It will be a task for the member states to pass legislation to provide subsequent 
new entrants with emission allowances. Thus individual detailed rules may be 
drawn up. 
It should be noted that the Commission does not intend to have a say in the 
quantity of GHG allowances to be allocated by the member states. Only one flexible 
restriction is applied, by which the total quantity of allowances ‘should be consistent’ 
with the Kyoto quota undertaking. Any member state may, however, decide to 
restrict the total emissions of the sectors concerned in a way that is different from its 
Kyoto undertaking, by reducing the total quantity of allocated allowances. After the 
initial allocation of allowances, anyone may participate in trading, i.e. any natural or 
legal person may purchase allowances. Within the period, and among the EU 
member states, there will be no administrative obstacles to trading, in keeping with 
the principle of free movement of goods and capital. Information on the allocation 
mechanisms and their effects will be presented in more detail in the related study 
No. 2. 
Monitoring, reporting, verification, submission and cancellation of allowances  
Compliance is achieved through a complex administrative process. An 
emission permit also sets out the reporting and monitoring rules. Monitoring may be 
carried out through calculations or measurements. A permit holder has to report its 
CO2 emissions to the national authority at the end of each year. The contents of the 
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reports have to be proven by an audit in a professionally sound report produced by 
an independent expert (verification). A quantity of allowances matching the actual 
annual CO2 emission has to be submitted – surrendered – to the authority of the 
member state in which the entity’s plant is operating, by 31 March of the year 
following the year concerned, together with the verification audit produced as 
described above. The allowances submitted by companies are cancelled by the 
authority. Cancellation may be requested at any time (electronic registration of 
allowances). 
Sanctions 
Each tonne of CO2 by which the permit holder’s emissions exceed the quantity 
of allowances surrendered, will incur a penalty. In the first period, the amount of the 
penalty will be 40 EUR/t, and in the second period it will equal 100 EUR/t. The 
missing quantity of allowances must be surrendered in the next year. Accordingly, 
failure to surrender the necessary quantity of allowances is an expensive mistake. 
The original proposal of the Commission specified a different sanction: it 
would have been worth purchasing allowances on the secondary market at any price, 
rather than paying the penalty, for there was no ceiling on the amount of the penalty. 
It could not be below 50 EUR/t and 100 EUR/t in the first and second periods, 
respectively, but if the price of allowances on the market exceeded half this amount, 
the penalty would have equalled twice the amount of the market price. This would 
have led to compliance at uncertain but probably higher costs. This technique of 
sanctioning could be criticised for its uncertainty. This could have been prevented, 
for example, by insisting that, instead of the higher of 50 EUR/t and the average 
market price of CO2 emissions in the preceding year, the lower of the two could be 
imposed as a penalty. In this way the cost of compliance would have been limited 
from above, even if the permit holders did not have a sufficient quantity of 
allowances for their emissions. In contrast to a flexibly growing penalty, which 
guarantees that the emissions do not exceed the quantity of allowances, the 
disadvantage of a fixed penalty is that the quantity of the emissions becomes 
uncertain, for the price of the allowances may reach the amount of the penalty. 
A summary of the authorities’ tasks  
1. The competent authority or authorities delegate responsibility for: 
– Issue of permits  
– Allocation of allowances 
– Monitoring 
– Reporting and verification  
– Sanctioning (penalty) 
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2. The National Registry is responsible for: 
– Account keeping 
– Registration of commercial transactions  
– Cancellation  
3.  There is a maintained national GHG inventory.  
Evaluation of the EU CO2 Emission Trading Directive  
The importance of the Directive lies primarily in transferring the right of CO2 
emission from the realm of freely accessible public goods to the category of factors of 
production of limited accessibility. The most potent provisions of the regulation may 
be summed up in two points. Firstly, it determines for companies in five economic 
sectors what the newly defined ownership rights cover after they have acquired the 
emission allowances. The other fundamental achievement of the regulation is the 
removal of most of the transactional restrictions among the 25 member states to 
enable free trading in these ownership rights. The following is an evaluation of the 
provisions of the Directive concerning ownership rights, allocation and control. 
Attention will be drawn to certain important market-related effects of the 
development of the trade in allowances. 
Ownership rights 
The essential role of the definition of ownership rights in relation to external 
effects has been analysed in a substantial volume of theoretical literature ever since 
Coase (1960). According to theoretical considerations, the inefficient environmental 
status is caused by the lack of identification of ownership rights, and therefore how 
the Directive defines ownership rights is the key to resolving the regulatory task. H. 
Demsetz (1964) regards the actual attributes of ownership rights to be important and 
emphasises the importance of the enforceability of such rights from the perspective 
of economic analysis of ownership rights. Accordingly, it should be pointed out that 
the Directive imposes a substantial restriction on the actual attributes of the emission 
rights: there are spatial and temporal restrictions on disposal of the emission 
allowances. The emission allowances may only be sold in the EU member states, and 
there is no provision for the existence of ownership rights in an unchanged form over 
a longer period of time. The regulator is not obliged to provide the rights 
(allowances) granted for the three-year period between 2005 and 2007, for the period 
beginning in 2008. During the subsequent five-year period, the emission allowances 
may, in principle, be freely reallocated but, according to Annex III, the member states 
have to distribute the allowances that embody the emission rights in each year to the 
regulated companies in proportion. Even if this is guaranteed by the regulation in 
principle, it still does not provide complete ownership rights, because a company 
does not receive the whole of its allowances for the five year period at the beginning 
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of 2008, and thus it may not use them in its own hedging transactions; it may not use 
them to raise funds; and may not regard them as part of the company assets. In 
principle, the member states are obliged (‘shall issue’ Article 13.3) to provide for the 
existence of emission allowances held by companies in 2012 for the subsequent 
regulatory period, as well. The authenticity of this is essential, since the benefits of 
the CO2 emission-reducing investments will depend on the number of years during 
which the company is entitled to sell allowances corresponding to the reduction in 
emissions. This issue is discussed in more detail in our related study No. 2. Another 
uncertainty inherent in Annex III is whether a company that terminates its operations 
may freely dispose of its emission allowances: whether it may sell them off, just as it 
sells its assets. On the whole, however, a company that conducts its normal 
operations may freely decide whether to retain or sell the emission rights it has 
acquired and, accordingly, it has a right to the benefits originating from ownership. 
Allocation 
H. Dales (1968) was the first author to formulate the theory that the ownership 
rights that may be defined with respect to natural resources considered to be ‘scarce’ 
(such as the CO2 absorbing capacity of the atmosphere without climate change) 
should be allocated to those who are willing to pay the highest price for them. The 
Directive provides a formal possibility for a small (5 or 10%) proportion of the total 
quantity of allowances to be auctioned. Baumol and Oates (1988) point out that the 
loss of efficiency that results from a departure from initial auctioning is compensated 
for by the fact that the political chances of successfully introducing the regulation are 
enhanced by the allocation of allowances free of charge, since that provides a more 
acceptable initial situation for the companies concerned. The question is what effect 
the auctioning of this limited quantity of allowances will have on the effectiveness of 
the regulation. In our view, the auctioning of 10% of the allowances may be enough 
to combine the advantages of quantitative and economic regulation (to be described 
in more detail in our related study No. 2). 
In principle, the fastest way of distributing ownership of the emission 
allowances, to equalise the marginal costs of emission abatement in the regulated 
sectors, is by auction. Such a process of levelling of marginal abatement costs, 
however, may also take place where the initial distribution of the allowances is not 
efficient, but the bargaining process and the transactions are relatively free of costs.12 
According to this view, the Directive may be regarded as consistent since, in parallel 
with the definition and allocation of the emission permits, it provides for universal 
recognition in each of the 25 member states and stipulates that free trading may only 
be restricted in the case of forward transactions. This will provide a real chance to 
                                                 
12 There is a strict interpretation of the Coase theorem, according to which the outcome of the 
bargaining process will not be independent of the initial establishment of ownership rights, only the 
Pareto efficiency of the outcome may be expected in the case of zero transaction costs. (Szakadát L. 
(1995); H. Varian (1995), pp 649.) 
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level the simultaneous differences in the costs of abatement, but the cost-cutting 
effects of long-term investments and emission-reducing innovations remain 
questionable. 
P. Cramton and S. Kerr (2002) reviewed the effects of the different 
mechanisms of distributing the CO2 emission allowances on the distribution of 
incomes. Their basic theoretical assumption is that the restriction of CO2 emissions – 
in other words, carbon regulation – creates scarcity in the economic sectors 
concerned. Scarcity creates rent, the distribution of which is a complex regulatory 
task. They reviewed the issue on the basis of the following figure. 
If regulation is to bring about a certain reduction in carbon emissions, and if to 
this end it intends to reduce total consumption in the market of a given product from 
Q0 to Q1, the original P0 equilibrium price will increase to PD. This is what the 
consumer will have to pay, but the manufacturers will only receive PS in sales 
revenue. The difference between the two is the tax on carbon emissions falling on 
quantity Q of the given product, or the price of the tradable emission allowances. 
Figure 5. The scarcity rent, the deadweight loss, distribution and price effects originating 
from the introduction of carbon regulation 
Source: Cramton and Kerr (2002). 
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The above price changes will come about through any type of carbon 
regulation: a given level of carbon allowance or an equivalent carbon tax will result 
in the same level of rent (based on perfect information), as is indicated in the figure 
by the light grey area. The regulation will, however, determine who the rent will be 
enjoyed by. If a tax is applied, the rent is collected by the state. The same applies if all 
the allowances are auctioned. If, however, emission allowances are distributed by the 
state free of charge, the scarcity rent is handed over to a preferred group of entities. 
Cramton and Kerr argue that this is not simply a political question; indeed, for 
economic considerations, if carbon emission is to be regulated by emission 
allowances rather than by taxation, then the allowances should be distributed at 
auction rather than just handed over free of charge. 
Alleviation of the existing distorting effects of taxation is a permanent task for 
the state’s taxation policy. The figure clearly shows that the introduction of carbon 
regulation also results in distortion: the deadweight welfare loss marked by the dark 
grey triangle is a real loss both to consumers and manufacturers (as well as to the 
state). If the area of the scarcity rent is state revenue, it would clearly provide 
sufficient funds for adjustments to demand or supply (in some form of compensation 
or tax alleviation) to reduce the social deadweight loss. Furthermore, the expected 
permanent nature and huge volume of the carbon rent (since the economy is going to 
be substantially carbon-dependent for quite some time to come) makes it a suitable 
means of raising revenue for the state, to enable it to reduce other taxes that have 
distorting effects. If carbon regulation first compensates the deadweight loss of the 
carbon market, then it will be capable of providing continued state revenue without 
distortions. According to some research – quoted by Cramton and Kerr – one tax 
dollar in the US costs approximately $1.3, taking into account the costs of the effects 
that distort the market. Accordingly, a significant part of the rent could be 
withdrawn from the carbon market at zero cost (this is the subject of the so-called 
‘double dividend’ debate: for more details see, for instance, Goulder, 1997). 
The distribution of rent and the price effects jointly make up the distribution 
effect. The rent is created by the establishment of ownership rights: in the case of 
taxation or the auctioning of all the emission allowances, the ownership of carbon 
emission is transferred from the category of public goods into the ownership of the 
state (i.e. the taxpayers), while allocation of the allowances free of charge will turn 
the emission right from a public good into the private property of a preferred group. 
The price effects are determined by the relative slope of supply and demand that 
characterise the given market. Prices will increase faster where flexibility is less 
extensive. In the above figure a larger part of the funds collected by the state through 
carbon taxes would be paid by consumers (part of the grey rectangle above P0) than 
by sellers (the part below P0). As a matter of course, the figure will change both in the 
short and in the long run. Capital investment and labour are both inflexible in the 
short term. In the longer term, however, both the capital market and the labour 
market are flexible and will adjust their supply to the new carbon regulation. For this 
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reason, consumers will bear the costs of carbon regulation in the longer run.13 This is 
not elaborated on by Cramton and Kerr, but it also follows from the above that prices 
will also increase in competitive markets if producers are granted emission 
allowances free of charge in one country and for a price in another. In this case the 
state allocating the allowances free of charge grants the emission right to the 
producers, who will then collect the whole amount of the scarcity rent from the 
consumers. If the companies perceive an opportunity cost to the allowances allocated 
free of charge, the above statement will also hold true if all companies are granted 
emission rights free of charge. On the whole, therefore, the allocation of all the 
emission allowances against payment of money (in the form of a carbon tax or 
auctioning of all the allowances) will ensure the most efficient allocation of the 
scarcity rent. 
One more argument is often quoted in support of grandfathering, that is the 
granting of emission permits free of charge to entities that have been responsible for 
CO2 emissions beforehand: it has a favourable effect on the competitiveness of the 
companies concerned. We have seen that the development of a given amount of 
carbon rent results in the same deadweight loss regardless of whether the rent is 
owned by companies or the state. According to Cramton and Kerr, while state 
ownership of the rent may provide a source of income for the alleviation of the 
deadweight loss (e.g. compensation of demand or supply), the transfer of the rent to 
companies will result in a loss of competitiveness owing to the uncompensated 
deadweight loss. In our view, this is an empirical question: it should be seen in each 
individual case whether there is a level of competition that would prompt companies 
to invest the benefits originating from the rent, into their supply. If this takes place in 
a competitive market, the allocation of allowances free of charge will have no adverse 
effect on competitiveness; indeed, it may even improve the relative competitive 
position of companies. At the same time, the rewarding of past emission by 
allocating an allowance free of charge will not actually reveal anything about the 
longer-term marginal costs of a unit of carbon emission. Nevertheless, their relation 
to the long-term marginal abatement cost will express the impact of the introduction 
of carbon regulation on the competitiveness of the individual company. New 
entrants in an industry will bring with them technologies that are chosen and 
designed with a view to the existing and expected CO2 emission costs. If the cost is 
higher than zero the new entrants will enter the market with more CO2-efficient 
technologies than those companies already in the market. Therefore, free allocation 
of allowances (grandfathering) is definitely not a general panacea for the declining 
competitiveness of certain companies in the case of marginal costs of CO2 emission 
that are positive in the long term. 
                                                 
13 What distribution effects should be expected in the Hungarian power market is an empirical 
question that goes beyond the scope of this study. 
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Control and compliance  
Since the effectiveness of regulation is expressed in this case in the realisation 
of the emission level prescribed by the state, instead of the emissions agreed on 
between the parties concerned, assessment of the means of control and sanction is 
also important. According to the Directive, the costs of control and compliance 
should be shared between the state and the companies concerned. The prescribed 
level of the penalty (50 and 100 EUR/t) seems to be high enough,14 but the weight of 
the penalty is, of course, only one side of the effective cooperation of companies. 
According to the ‘crime and punishment theory’ of Becker (1968), we know that – 
besides the amount of the penalty – compliance with the rules also depends on the 
likelihood of the infringement being detected. If the benefit from infringement is in 
excess of the expected sanction, it is worth bypassing the regulation. In theory, if a 
company is risk-neutral and the likelihood of the irregularity being proved is p, the 
amount of the penalty to be imposed f is a positive function of the extra pollution v, 
the company will find it worth exceeding the permitted emissions so long as g ≥ 
f(v)*p(v)*v, i.e. so long as the benefit reaped through fraud exceeds the expected 
amount of the penalty. (Harford, 1978; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). 
The success of the US SO2 trading system has partly been a result of the 
effective operation of an efficient monitoring system. On the one hand, it provides 
real-time information on the quantities released, supplied by a monitoring system – 
installed on a mandatory basis – which detects the quantity of the emitted pollutants 
on an ongoing basis. Furthermore, companies that cannot cover their emissions with 
a sufficient quantity of emission allowances have had to pay a very heavy fine of 
2,000 $/t, and the officials held responsible for the violation have been liable to 
criminal proceedings.15 This high penalty rate increased the cost of bypassing the 
regulation and minimised the opportunistic inclinations of the companies concerned 
(IEA, 2001).  
By contrast, the EU Directive fails to impose an obligation concerning 
measuring of CO2 emissions. According to Annex IV of the Directive, the quantities 
released by the various sources may be established by calculations or measurements, 
but the results of measurements also have to be supported by calculations based on 
accepted methodologies. Calculations must be carried out using operation-specific 
emission factors established for each of the fuels used. According to Annex V, which 
contains the regulations concerning the verification procedure, review of the reports 
issued by the various polluting companies and control will be carried out by an 
independent verification organisation, which will review the reports and make onsite 
inspections where necessary. If the costs of verification are borne by the companies, it 
leads to a situation where the regulated party bears a substantial part of the 
monitoring costs, and this could lead to a distortion of the effective pollution 
                                                 
14 In comparison to the preliminary estimates of 5–25 EUR/tonne allowance prices. 
15 The price of SO2 emission permits was 70 $/tonne in 1996 (IEA, 2001, p. 31). 
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abatement cost structure. With verification paid for by the regulated party, an agency 
problem may arise between the verifying organisation and the regulating authority; 
however, if the state puts together a list of eligible verifying organisations, the efforts 
made by these organisations to preserve their reputation may alleviate the problem.16
Harrington (1988) sought an answer to the question of why the majority of 
companies observe the obligations resulting from the regulation, despite the fact that 
after 1978 the frequency of inspections was low in the USA and fines were imposed 
only rarely, even when infringements were detected. Harrington assessed the 
behaviour of companies in the case of environmental regulation, in a dynamic game 
theory model. He found that observing the obligations originating from regulations 
is in the interests of a company, even if the costs of compliance exceed the expected 
amount of the penalty in certain periods. His findings are in line with the conclusions 
of models that emphasise the impact of reputation as a factor that reduces moral 
hazard (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). The propensity to infringe rules, therefore, is 
also influenced by the fact that climate regulations have been introduced for the long 
term, and if a company has broken the rules it may expect increased attention from 
the regulating authority in later stages. (In the case of power plants approaching 
decommissioning the moral hazard will, of course, increase – the so-called ‘end of 
game’ problem – and this issue is not tackled by this Directive either.) 
In the case of power companies, supervision is facilitated by the fact that the 
system operator has precise, real-time information on the power released by the 
companies into the grid on an ongoing basis; accordingly, if their fuel use can also be 
controlled with an acceptable degree of precision, controlling is an easy task based on 
technology. 
Market effects  
In respect of the prospective market for allowances, attention should – based 
on Tietenberg (1985) – be paid to two phenomena that may stem from the Directive. 
From aggregation of the empirical research findings of a variety of operating 
emission trading systems (NOx, phosphorus, SO2), Tietenberg draws the conclusion 
that the initial allowance allocation mechanisms that reduce the quantity of the 
allowances allocated to individual companies in proportion to the original emissions 
do not take account of the effect of what is referred to as ‘economies of scale’, which 
is also functioning in the case of emission-reducing projects. Entities that emit large 
quantities of a pollutant can reduce a larger share of their emissions at a lower 
marginal cost than those that emit smaller quantities. This results in a market 
situation where a few large companies supply the market with emission allowances, 
and almost all smaller entities are buyers on the same market. If these companies are 
also competing in the market of their core products, attempts to enforce market 
                                                 
16 Though it may turn out later that it is more worthwhile for such verifying organisations to invent 
‘creative carbon accounting’ techniques and sell them to companies... 
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power by means of the emission market are to be expected. For this reason, 
governments should prepare for a combined manipulation of the power market and 
the CO2 emission allowance market through the pooling provisions of the Directive 
and the expansion of large European energy corporations. In the case of certain grid 
congestions, and during peak demand periods, this may lead to a reduction in 
production and an implicit barrier to market entry. 
Tietenberg (1985) has also generalised another observation concerning the 
markets in allowances. In the market of the emission of CFCs – chlorofluorocarbons – 
brought under regulation after their harmful effects on the stratospheric ozone layer 
were recognised, a typical cost difference developed between industries and 
companies in the early eighties. The enterprises of some industries massively 
reduced their emissions and the allowances allocated to them were purchased 
consistently by the same entities. This phenomenon should be explained by 
substitutability. For the companies that became net allowance sellers were those in 
whose technologies CFCs could be replaced with other materials (flexible foams, 
solvents, etc.) at low cost. The enterprises in whose products or processes CFCs could 
not be replaced or could be replaced only at high cost (rigid foams, liquid coolants, 
etc.) steadily purchased the emission allowances. In the case of CO2, a similar 
asymmetry is expected to develop between high-efficiency natural gas-fuelled 
facilities and low-efficiency outdated facilities, for the Directive promotes 
grandfathering-type allocation. It is practically impossible to reduce the unit 
emission of a combined cycle gas turbine any further. In the case of such power 
plants, an allowance needs to be purchased for each additional unit of production. By 
contrast, coal-fired power stations can substantially improve the CO2 efficiency of 
their operations, and accordingly they may be net sellers of allowances if their output 
is not changed; but even to increase their output they do not have to purchase 
allowances, if they are granted allowances that correspond to their original 
emissions. This phenomenon will go some way to balancing the increasing 
competitiveness of natural gas, in a natural way. 
There is a danger in the Hungarian power market that the above two 
phenomena, i.e. the effects originating from the differences in efficiency and those 
originating from the economies of scale, may combine. This would lead to a situation 
where, as a result of the combined effect of the two phenomena, natural gas-fuelled 
facilities that operate with higher or lower degrees of efficiency need to purchase 
emission allowances from old power plants that are larger in size and operate at 
lower levels of efficiency. For this reason any allowance-based regulation will have to 
pay special attention to this possibility, to be prepared for unintended situations of 
dominance in the market. The best protection seems to be offered by international 
sale and purchase of allowances in the EU-25 countries at the lowest possible 
transaction costs. 
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